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Abstract
Nowadays, collaborative filtering recommender systems have been widely deployed
in many commercial companies to make profit. Neighbourhood-based collabora-
tive filtering is common and effective. To date, despite its effectiveness, there has
been little effort to explore their robustness and the impact of data poisoning attacks
on their performance. Can the neighbourhood-based recommender systems be eas-
ily fooled? To this end, we shed light on the robustness of neighbourhood-based
recommender systems and propose a novel data poisoning attack framework encod-
ing the purpose of attack and constraint against them. We firstly illustrate how to
calculate the optimal data poisoning attack, namely UNAttack. We inject a few
well-designed fake users into the recommender systems such that target items will
be recommended to as many normal users as possible. Extensive experiments are
conducted on three real-world datasets to validate the effectiveness and the trans-
ferability of our proposed method. Besides, some interesting phenomenons can be
found. For example, 1) neighbourhood-based recommender systems with Euclidean
Distance-based similarity have strong robustness. 2) the fake users can be trans-
ferred to attack the state-of-the-art collaborative filtering recommender systems
such as Neural Collaborative Filtering and Bayesian Personalized Ranking Matrix
Factorization.
KEYWORDS:
recommender system, data poisoning, adversarial attack, robustness
1 INTRODUCTION
With the booming of information, it is a big challenge for users to find valuable items that satisfy their preference. To
address this challenge, most of the existing recommender systems studies1,2,3 utilize users’ historical information, social net-
work information and items’ content to model users’ preference on items. Among these studies, one of the most widely used
technique in recommender systems is collaborative filtering (CF)4, which focuses on the users’ historical information. Depend-
ing on the methods utilized to learn the correlation between users’ historical information, CF recommender systems can be
divided into four categories: matrix-factorization-based methods5, graph-based methods6, association-rule-based methods7,8
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2and neighbourhood-based methods9. Numerous commercial companies (e.g., Netflix1, YouTube2, eBay3 and Taobao4) have
already applied CF recommender systems to their products, such as web and app, to alleviate the information overload, improve
users’ experience, and bring them tremendous economic benefits.
Recommender systems have the advantages of matching users personal interest, however, the overall recommendation result
is less robust. This problem is a non-ignorable downside. Several previous studies10,11 have already pointed out that CF methods
are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks inducing the recommender system to a security risk. The collaborative recommendation
system will personalize the recommendation to the user based on the historical data of similar users, when it works normally.
However, this may not be the case. For example, an attacker with bad intentions (or a profit motive) quietly injects malicious
data with elaborate construction into recommender systems so that he can control the recommendation result as he desires and
destory the personal recommendation list.
Early data poisoning studies12,11 have applied handcraft rules to generate fake users, which usually achieve suboptimal attack
performance even if in the case of possessing the access to input data and knowing the recommendation algorithm. For example,
random attack11 randomly chooses filler-items for each fake user and assigns ratings to the filler-items from the normal distri-
bution of all the rating data. Average attack11 selects filler-items just the same as the random attack. The difference is that the
rating score assigned to the filler-item is based on the normal distribution of the rating data of the filler-item. These methods
can’t test the robust of recommender systems completely. In recent years, several studies13,14,15 about optimal data poisoning
attack against a certain type of recommender systems have been proposed. However, how to design an optimal data poisoning
attack based on neighborhood-based recommender systems remains a challenging problem.
Despite some advanced recommender systems have been proposed, neighborhood-based collaborative filtering remains one
of the most common and effective recommender systems16,17,18,19 and can be deployed by businesses companies, e.g., Ama-
zons20. In addition, the recently proposed research21 points out that neighborhood-based collaborative filtering outperforms
than some advanced deep the collaborative filtering models, (e.g., NCF22). Thus, proposing an optimal data poisoning attack to
test its robustness is an urgent and important issue. With this motivation, we propose an optimal data poisoning attack based on
neighborhood-based recommender systems, namely UNAttack. Neighborhood-based recommender systems are mainly based
on the similarity between users or items. The user’s preference on an item is learned through the user’s or the item’s 퐾 nearest
neighbours. In our method, the characteristics of the users’ 퐾 nearest neighbours will be utilized to promote target items (push
attack11). For example, in recommender systems, target items will be recommended to as many normal users as possible after
we inject a few fake users into the recommender systems. In data poisoning attack, the items which fake users rate is named as
filler-items. Due to the limited resources and to keep our attack hard to be detected, some constraints are defined as follows: 1)
in each attack, attackers can only inject 푗 fake users and each fake user can only rate 푧 filler-items at most, 2) the rating scores
user give to the items must be integer. We regard data poisoning attack as an optimization problem with the aforementioned
constraint in order to get the filler-items and the rating scores of each fake user. To demonstrate its effectiveness, extensive exper-
iments are conducted on three real-world datasets. The experimental results show that our UNAttack performs far better than
conventional attack methods and other state-of-the-art attack methods. In addition, we observe that the fake users we generate
can attack the state-of-the-art CF recommender systems, such as NCF23 and BPRMF23. It means that UNAttack is still effective
even if the attackers do not know the details of the recommended systems, namely the black-box attack24.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows
• We propose a general and mathematical framework for optimal data poisoning attack against CF recommender systems.
• We encode data poisoning attack against neighborhood-based methods into our framework as an optimization problem.
Then, we present the solution to this problem so as to generate more effective fake users.
• To demonstrate how our method works, we conduct a series of experiments on three public datasets. Both quantitative and
qualitative analysis justify that our attack methods can achieve good attack performance, not only in neighborhood-based
recommender systems, but also in other collaborative filtering algorithms such as BPRMF and NCF.
1https://www.netflix.com
2https://www.youtube.com
3https://www.ebay.com
4https://www.taobao.com
32 RELATEDWORK
The existing research about data poisoning attack has attracted the attention of many people.25 propose a data poisoning attack
against autoregressive models using the optimal methods.26 introduce data poisoning strategies to test knowledge graph embed-
ding robustness.27 design data poisoning attack algorithms targeting objective and output. Existing research about data poisoning
attack (also called as shilling attacks12) against the recommender system studied from more than 10 years ago. Data poisoning
attacks aim to make target items be recommended to as more users as possible. Specifically, when performing data poisoning
attacks, attackers firstly registers a few fake accounts in the service. Then they control each fake account to assign well-esigned
rating scores to a carefully chosen subset of items.12 proposed two kinds of data poisoning attack methods: random attack and
average attack. Both these attack methods randomly chose filler-items for each fake user. In11, the authors proposed the band-
wagon attack, which associated the filler-items with popularity. Different from the random attack, bandwagon attack selected a
part of the popular items together with some randomly selected items as filler-items.
In recent years, a few data poisoning attack methods, which uses the optimization technique to get the filler-items and the
assigned ratings of fake users, have been proposed. A study13 proposed a data poisoning attack against matrix-factorization-
based recommender systems making the root-mean-squared-error become larger than its original value. Fake co-visitation14is a
injection attack against association-rule-based recommender systems by constructing attack as a constrained linear optimization
problem.15 proposed an optimized data poisoning attack for graph-based recommender systems.
Besides, the paper28 proposed a new type of attack method named profile pollution attack against recommender system and
other web services, in which attackers aimed to pollute users’ profile, such as browsing and clicking session, via cross-site
request forgery29. However, they only can perform the attack on a small scale. In recently, leakage of private information has
attracted more and more peopleâĂŹs attention30 and especially the edge computing and fog computing are used, which can
collect more sensitive information than the remote cloud. Privacy attack mainly contains the item inference attacks and attribute
inference attacks. The work31 proposed privacy attacks to infer the items that a target user has rated via utilizing the publicly
available reviews of users. The authors have already proved that these methods can be performed on several popular webs such
as Amazon5, LibraryThing6 and Lastfm7. Attribute inference attacks32 are the technique aiming to acquire the users’ privacy
attributes with the users’ interaction information. Generally, users’ privacy attributes (e.g., gender, political view, interests, and
location) will be reflected by the users’ interaction information (e.g., buy, rate and click items). After collecting a few users’
interaction information and their privacy attributes, the attacker trained a classifier model with interaction information as input
and privacy attributes as the prediction. This classifier model will be applied to predict the attributes of users who are unwilling
to make their privacy attributes public. These methods have been demonstrated to be feasible by several studies32,33,34.
3 METHOD
We first introduce the formulation of neighborhood-based recommender systems. Then, we define data poisoning attacks as
an optimization problem and approximate this optimization problem. Lastly, the solution to this problem will be introduced to
generate fake users.
3.1 Neighborhood-based recommender systems
Neighborhood-based recommender systems are the earliest CF recommender systemsmethod including user-based CF and item-
based CF. Both of them have been widely applied in various web services. In the user-based CF, when the model recommends
items to the user, it selects the top-K nearest-neighbors of the user via calculating the similarity between the user and others, and
then predicts the preference of the user on items based on the preference of top-K nearest-neighbours. For the item-based CF,
the model considers the similarity based on the items. In this paper, we mainly focus on using our methods against user-based
CF by injecting fake users into the recommender systems. We assume there is a set of 푚 users, 푈 = {푢1, 푢2, ..., 푢푚}, a set of 푛
items, 퐼 = {푖1, 푖1, ....., 푖푛} and a sparse matrix푅푚×푛.푋푢 represents the n-dimensional item rating vector for user 푢. Each element
푋푢푖 in the vector 푋푢 denotes the explicit preference of user 푢 on item 푖. The predicted preference of user 푢 on item 푖 based on
5https://www.amazon.com/
6https://www.librarything.com/
7https://www.last.fm/zh/
4FIGURE 1 intuitive sketch to explain the process of data poisoning.
user-based CF can be calculated as follows:
푝푢푖 =
∑
푣∈푆(푢,퐾)∩푈+푖 )
푠푢푣푋푣푖 (1)
where 푆(푢,퐾) is the set of top-K nearest neighbours of user 푢, 푈+푖 denotes a set of users who rate item 푖. 푠푢푣 is the similaritybetween user 푢 and 푣.
3.2 Problem Definition
According to the intent, data poisoning attack can be divided into two categories: target attacks and non-target attacks11. In
non-target attacks, the intent could be to deteriorate the recommendation quality of all users.13 proposed a data poisoning attack
against matrix-factorization-based recommender systems making the root-mean-squared-error become larger than its original
value. Our work will focus on the target attack. We consider the case where an attacker generates a few of realistic-looking fake
users with the desires of promoting a group of items from himself company into target users’ top lists or removing a group of
items from competitor company from target users’ top lists. Figure 1 illustrates how data poisoning attacks work against the
recommender systems. Thus, the performance of our data poisoning attack method can be measured via 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표, and the
퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 of item 푖 is defined as follows:
퐻푢푖 =
{
1, 푖 휖 퐿푢
0, 표푡ℎ푒푟푤푖푠푒
퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표푖 =
∑
푢∈푈−푖
퐻푢푖||푈−푖 ||
(2)
Let 퐿푢 denote the set of top-N items list that user-based CF recommend to user 푢. 푈−푖 denotes a set of users who do not rateitem 푖, namely target users, and |푈−푖 | is the number of target users.Considering the attacker’s intent in the paper is to promote target items into as many target users’ top-N lists as possible.
Demoting target items out of target users’ top-N lists is the special case of promoting11. For concreteness, attackers can promote
other items so as to push target items out of target users’ top-N lists. Therefore, the key challenge for us is how to generate an
n-dimensional item rating vector for each fake user who can maximize the퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 of the target item. In reality, attackers often
suffer from some constraints in poisoning the data such as the cost of generating fake users and detection avoidance. As such,
the number of fake users, the number of filler-items of each fake user and the range of rating scores will be restricted. Let 푋푓
5be the n-dimensional item rating vector for fake user 푓 , in which 푋푓푖 is the score that fake user 푓 gives to the item 푖. Under the
consideration above, we describe data poisoning attack task as the following optimization problem:
푀푎푥푖푚푖푧푒(퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표)
푠.푡. |||푋푓 |||′ ≤ 푧,
푋푓푖 ∈
{
0, 1, ..., 푟푚푎푥
}
,
∀푓 ∈
{
푓1, 푓2, ..., 푓푗
} (3)
where {푓1, 푓2, ..., 푓푗} denotes the set of 푗 fake users, |푋푓 |′ denotes the number of filler-items for each fake user (|푋푓 |′ ≤
푧). The rating scores of items are in the interval {0, 1, ..., 푟푚푎푥}. It is worth noting that this framework in Eq.3 is suitable for
target data poisoning attack against any recommender systems. In this paper, we focus on encoding the neighborhood-based
recommendation into this framework.
3.3 Problem Approximation
It is clearly intractable to find the optimal solution to the optimized problem in Eq.3 due to the following two reasons. Firstly,
the item rating vector 푋푓 (푓 ∈ {푓1, 푓2, ..., 푓푗}) of the fake user has the implicit and complicated dependency with 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표.
Secondly, the rating score 푋푓푖 is a discrete value, which means that it can not be optimized via gradient-based methods such as
gradient descent.
To overcome the difficulties mentioned above, several approximation techniques have been proposed. Firstly, we will optimize
the fake users one by one based on the new data (including the normal users and the fake users generated before). Secondly, we
borrow the strategy from the ranking problem to construct pairwise loss function, in which after training itemwith a higher value
means the user is more likely to buy. Through this way, we obtain the filler-items of the fake user by selecting top-푧 items with
the highest scores after training. Thirdly, the filler-items will be assigned integer rating scores to mimic normal user behaviours.
If attackers want to maximize the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표, he should make the target item 푡 appear in the top-N recommended list 퐿푢 as
more as possible for each user 푢 ∈ 푈−푡 . To achieve this purpose, the objective function must be converted into the loss functionthat is convenient to be optimized. For user 푢, if 푡 appears in the recommended list 퐿푢, then users’ rating scores to 푡 must be
higher than item 푖 (푖 ∈ 퐿푢), which can be expressed as 푝푢푡 > 푝푢푖. However, according to Eq.1, we can know that the user-based
CF evaluates the user’s preference through his top-K nearest neighbors’ preference. Therefore, if the attacker wants to impose
influence on 푝푢푡 and 푝푢푖, he must make the fake user 푓 be in the top-K nearest neighbours of user 푢, which can be expressed as
푠푢푓 > 푠푢푣.
More specifically, to approximate the objective function퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표, the loss function must satisfy a condition when it becomes
smaller, 푠푢푓 and 푝푢푡 become higher than 푠푢푣 and 푝푢푖, respectively. We borrow the idea from BPR pairwise loss and formulate the
user 푢’s loss function as follows:
푙표푠푠1 =
∑
푣∈푆(푢,퐾)
휎(푠푢푣 − 푠푢푓 )
푙표푠푠2 =
∑
푖∈퐿푢
휎(푝푢푖 − 푝푢푡)
푙표푠푠푢 = (1 − 휆)푙표푠푠1 + 휆푙표푠푠2
(4)
where 휎(푥) = 1
1+푒−푥
is the sigmoid function. 휆 ∈ [0, 1] is the trade-off parameters. 휆 controls the relative importance of 푙표푠푠1
and 푙표푠푠2. By minimizing 푙표푠푠푢, we can promote the fake user into the top-K nearest neighbours 푆(푢,퐾) and promote the target
item into the user’s top-N items 퐿푢 list.
For all the normal users in 푈−푡 , the loss function is the sum of their single loss function:
푙표푠푠 =
∑
푢∈푈−푡
푙표푠푠푢 (5)
6With the loss function, we can consider the optimization problem as follows:
푀푖푛푖푚푖푧푒(퐹 (푋푓 ) = 푙표푠푠)
푠.푡. |||푋푓 |||′ ≤ 푧,
푋푓푖 ∈
{
0, 1, ..., 푟푚푎푥
} (6)
3.4 Fake Users Generation
We elaborate the following specific steps on how to solve the optimized problem in Eq.6 and generate fake users.
1) choosing the optimal filler-items for fake users. In this step, the stochastic gradient descent will be chosen to solve the
problem in Eq.6 due to its ease in deriving the update strategy. Discrete value is hard to be optimized by gradient descent, so
푋푓푖 is relaxed as a continuous value in training phrase. In this section,we choose the Cosine Similarity to calculate the similarity
between users as the illustrative example. In iteration 푡, 푋푓 (푡) will be updated as follows:
푋(푡)푓 = 푃푟표푗푒푐푡(푋
(푡−1)
푓 − 휂
휕퐹 (푋푓 )
휕푋푓
) (7)
where 푃푟표푗푒푐푡(푥) is the project function that cuts each 푋푓푖 into the range [0, 1, ..푟푚푎푥]. The gradient of 퐹 (푋푓 ) (with respect to
푋푓 ) are as follows:
휕퐹 (푋푓 )
휕푋푓
=
∑
푢∈푈−푡
(1 − 휆)
휕푙표푠푠1
휕푋푓
+ 휆
휕푙표푠푠2
휕푋푓
(8)
휕(푙표푠푠1)
휕푋푓
=
∑
푣∈푆(푢,푘)
휕휎(푄)
휕푄
(
휕푠푢푣
휕푋푓
−
휕푠푢푓
휕푋푓
) (9)
휕(푙표푠푠2)
휕푋푓
=
∑
푖∈퐿푢
∑
푣∈푊
휕휎(푃 )
휕푃
(
휕푠푢푣푋푣푖
휕푋푓
−
휕푠푢푓푋푓푡
휕푋푓
) (10)
where 푄 = 푠푢푣 − 푠푢푓 , 푃 = 푝푢푖 − 푝푢푡 and푊 = (푆(푢, 푘) ∩ 푈+푖 )
Before calculating the 휕퐹 (푋푓 )
휕푋푓
, we must solve the 휕푠푢푓
휕푋푓
. 푠푢푓 denotes the similarity between user 푢 and 푓 . In Eq.9 and 10, the
Cosine Similarity will be used and the gradient 휕푠푢푓
휕푋푓
can be computed as follows:
휕푠푢푓
휕푋푓
=
푋푢‖‖푋푢‖‖ ‖‖‖푋푓‖‖‖ −
푋푢푋푓‖‖푋푢‖‖ ‖‖‖푋푓‖‖‖
푋푓‖‖‖푋푓‖‖‖2 (11)
2) assigning integer rating scores to filler-items. After finishing the training of 푋푓 , we use the following several strategies to
convert the continuous value into integer rating score: first of all, let 푋푓푡 = 푟푚푎푥. In other words, we give the target items the
maximum ratings. Secondly, inspired by the ranking problem, all items will be ranked according to 푋푓푖, and top-푧 items with
the highest values will be chosen as the filler-items. Because we consider that after training the items with higher value means
the fake user is more likely to buy them. Finally, the rating score assigned to each filler-item is drawn from a normal distribution
of the normal users’ rating data of this item. After that, we can keep our fake user mimic the normal user’s behaviours as well
as avoid potential detection. Algorithm 1 shows the detailed procedure of our solution. The time cost of fake users generation is
푗 × 푧 , where 푗 is the number of fake users and 푧 is the number of filler items.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of our proposed method, UNAttack, with all the baselines on three real-
world datasets. Then, we explore the impact of hyper-parameters on the UNAttack. Finally, the performance of transferability
on the UNAttack will be introduced.
7Algorithm 1 UNAttack
Input: Matrix 푅푚×푛
Parameter: 휆,퐾,푁, 푧, 푗
Output: 푗 fake users
1: for each fake user f do
2: Solve the problem in Eq.6 with current rating matrix 푅 to get 푋푓
3: Let 푋푓푡 = 푟푚푎푥
4: Select 푧 items with highest value in 푋푓푖 as filler items.
5: For each filler-items j, 푋푓푗 ∼ (휇푗 , 휎2푗 )
6: 푅푚×푛 = 푅푚×푛 ∪푋푓
7: end for
4.1 Experiment Settings
TABLE 1 Statistics of the datasets.
Datasets #users #items #ratings sparsity average
FilmTurst 1,508 2,071 35,497 98.86% 23
Movielens 943 1,682 100,000 95.72% 106
Amazons 2,378 2,525 23,613 99.60% 10
Dataset description. We conduct extensive experiments on three real-world datasets: FilmTrust35, Movielens8, and Amazons
Video9. Table 1 summarizes their detailed statistics. For each dataset, 80% of interactions information between users and items
will be split into the training set and the remaining 20% as the test set. Then, we randomly select aside 10% of the training data
as validation set for tuning hyper-parameters of the recommendation model. The word average in the Table 1 means the average
rating number of each users. The definition of sparsity in Table 1 is as follows:
푆푝푎푟푠푖푡푦 = 1 − #푟푎푡푖푛푔푠
#푢푠푒푟푠 × #푖푡푒푚푠
(12)
Comparedmethods.We compared our method with several data poisoning attack methods using the퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표@푁 (퐻푅@푁).
• None. This represents the situation that recommendation is normal and do not suffer any attack.
• Random attack12. This method randomly chooses filler-items for each fake user, and assigns ratings to the filler-items
from the normal distribution of all the rating data.
• Average attack12. It selects filler-items just the same as the random attack. However, the rating score assigned to the
filler-item is based on the normal distribution of the rating data of the filler-item.
• Bandwagon attack11. Bandwagon attack associates the filler-items with popularity. In our experiments, for each fake
user, we select 푧 × 20% items which get high average scores and randomly choose 푧 × 80% as filler-items, and assign
rating to the filler-items from the normal distribution of the whole rating data.
• Co-visitation attack14. Fake Co-visitation injection attack is designed for the association-rule-based recommender
systems. Our experiment only considers the attack with injecting fake users. Therefore, we use the method in Fake Co-
visitation injection attack to choose the filler-items for fake users. Moreover, if the item 푖 is frequently rated with the target
item 푡 at the same time, it has a high probability to be selected as filler-items. The way we assign the rating score for
filler-items is the same as the average attack.
8https://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/
9http://jmcauley.ucsd.edu/data/amazon/
8TABLE 2 Overall performance between our method and other data poisoning attack methods.
Dataset Method Random target items Cold-start target items Warm-start target items0.50% 1% 2% 0.50% 1% 2% 0.50% 1% 2%
FilmTrust
None 0.0058 0.0058 0.0058 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.3997 0.3997 0.3997
Random 0.0075 0.0087 0.0107 0.0010 0.0013 0.0042 0.4016 0.4033 0.4084
Average 0.0075 0.0085 0.0106 0.0006 0.0015 0.0045 0.4017 0.4051 0.411
Popular 0.0069 0.0082 0.0101 0.0009 0.0017 0.0035 0.4036 0.4051 0.4084
Co-visitation 0.0073 0.0102 0.0314 0.0001 0.0022 0.0207 0.4125 0.4182 0.4246
UNAttack 0.0578 0.0881 0.1274 0.0533 0.0827 0.1142 0.4566 0.4804 0.4984
Movielens
None 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2472 0.2472 0.2472
Random 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2472 0.2472 0.2472
Average 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2472 0.2472 0.2472
Popular 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2472 0.2472 0.2472
Co-visitation 0.0062 0.0107 0.0469 0.0000 0.0004 0.0263 0.2556 0.2700 0.3103
UNAttack 0.0093 0.0202 0.0911 0.0000 0.0040 0.0675 0.2655 0.2970 0.4142
Aamzons
None 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.1897 0.1897 0.1897
Random 0.0097 0.0184 0.0429 0.0058 0.0151 0.039 0.2055 0.2186 0.2525
Average 0.0131 0.023 0.0485 0.0085 0.0175 0.0432 0.2052 0.2207 0.2527
Popular 0.0126 0.0213 0.0452 0.0074 0.0161 0.0362 0.2044 0.2167 0.2445
Co-visitation 0.0199 0.0437 0.1035 0.0154 0.0400 0.1015 0.2254 0.3004 0.3194
UNAttack 0.0912 0.1304 0.1794 0.0926 0.1209 0.1572 0.2837 0.309 0.3725
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FIGURE 2 Impact of the type of similarity measurement method.
Parameter Setting. The details of our parameter are as follows. The best 휆 values will be used for each dataset. 푧 will be set
to the average rating number of normal users. Without specification, in FilmTrust, 휆 = 0.6, 퐾 = 30, 푁 = 20, 푧 = 23. In
Movielens, 휆 = 0.5, 퐾 = 30, 푁 = 20, 푧 = 106. In Amazons, 휆 = 0.3, 퐾 = 30, 푁 = 20, 푧 = 10. Besides, the number of fake
users (attack size) is set from 0.5% to 2% of the number of normal users. By default, we assume that the similarity between users
is calculated by Cosine Similarity. To demonstrate the performance of our method, a part of items are first selected randomly
as random items. Secondly, we consider the items whose rating data is less than 5 and which are almost not recommended to
normal users at all (None performance less than 0.001) as cold-start target items. Moreover, the items with high possibility are
recommended to normal users before the attack will be regarded (None performance higher than 0.1) as warm-start items. We
select 10 target items for each type of target items (eg. random items, cold-start items and warm-start items) to calculate the
average퐻푅@푁 . All of the methods run on an Intel Core i7 with 2.2 GHz , 2080 Ti GPU,128GB RAM, 64 bit system.
94.2 Experiment Results
Overall performance. Table 2 summarizes the overall performance of baselines and our attack method. From the table, we can
obtain the following observations:
• Our attack method can promote the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 in different types of target items effectively by injecting a few fake users.
For example, when injecting 1% fake users, in FilmTrust datasets, our attack method increases the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 15.2 times
as much as None in random target items. In Amazons dataset, the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 of our attack method is 35.9 times higher
than None in random target items. For the warm-start items, our method improves 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 by 20.1% than None in the
Filmtrust dataset.
• our UNAttack achieves the highest threat in the same attack size comparing with other methods. For example, in FilmTrust
datasets, when injecting 1% fake users, the퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 of our attack method attacks random target items is 10 times higher
than Random attack, Average attack, and Bandwagon attack, and 8.6 times than Co-visitation attack. If we attack warm-
start items, our method can increase the퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 by 20.1%, and the Co-visitation method can only increase the퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표
by 4.4%.
• The improvement of 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 when attacking the cold-start target items is more obvious than random target items. For
example, when injecting 1% fake users, in FilmTrust datasets, the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 of our attack method is 15.2 times and 827
times higher than None in random target items and cold-start target items, respectively. In Amazons dataset, our attack
method increases the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 35.9 times and 287 times as compared with None in random target items and cold-start
target items, respectively. In addition, the increment of퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 in warm-start target items is less effective than in random
target items. For instance, the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 of UNAttack is 1.3 and 15.2 times higher than None in warm-start target items
and random target items, respectively.
• Data poisoning attack can achieve better performance in the sparse dataset than the dense dataset. For example, when
injecting 2% fake users and attacking the random target items, in Amazons dataset, the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 of our attack method
achieves the highest performance (0.1794), and in the dense dataset, Movielens, the퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 is the lowest (0.0911).
• We can find that the time cost of fake users generation with UNAttack is small. In the Movielens dataset, attackers only
spend 8m56s if they generate the number of fake users equivalent to 2% of the number of normal users. In the Filmtrust
and Amazons dataset, they spend 12m8s and 28m27s respectively.
Impact of the type of similarity measurement method. User-based CF can take different types of similarity measurement
methods to calculate the similarity between users. Figure 2 shows the result of all attack methods against the User-based CF with
different similarity measurements, where the attack size = 2% and we attack random target items. The similarity measurement
methods includes Cosine Similarity, Euclidean Distance-based Similarity and Pearson Similarity. We can observe an interesting
insight that the performance of all attack methods on Cosine Similarity and Pearson Similarity is better than that on Euclidean
Distance-based Similarity. The reason is that EuclideanDistance-based Similarity focuses on the distance of two vectors in space,
while Cosine and Pearson Similarity focus on the direction of the two vectors in space. The experimental results demonstrate
that fake users are more similar in direction with real users and it is hard to reduce the distance between them. In other words,
it is difficult for attack method to promote퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 if user-based CF uses the Euclidean Distance-based similarity. Therefore,
the user-based CF with Euclidean Distance-based similarity has better robustness.
Impact of the number of filler-items. Figure 3 (a), (b) and (c) show the impact of the number of filler-items 푧 on our attack
method, where the attack size = 2% and we attack random target items. As we can see, in FilmtTrust and Amazons datasets
when 푧 is close to the average rating number of normal users (23 in FilmTrust, 8 in Amazons), the attack can achieve better
performance. If 푧 is larger than the average rating number, it is more difficult for fake users to imitate the behaviour of real users,
which decreases the performance of similarity calculation between fake users and real users. In the dense dataset Movielens, it
can be clearly seen that our attack method achieves more competitive and stable performances if 푧 is set higher than 50.
Impact of the number of recommended items. We fix the attack size = 2%, attack random target items and set the number
of recommended items 푁 to {1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50}. In Figure 3 (d), the smaller 푁 represents the harder the
neighborhood-based recommender system is to be attacked. From the figure, we can find that when푁 is small, our attack method
can also achieve good performance. For instance, in Amazons dataset, when푁 = 5, our method can still obtain 0.089퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표
(close to the퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 of warm-start items), which means our method can effectively promote the target items ranked in top-5
recommendation list.
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FIGURE 3 Impact of parameters: the number of filler-items, the number of recommended items, the number of users’ nearest
neighbours and the weight of different loss functions.
Impact of the number of users’ nearest neighbours. In Figure 3 (e), the number of nearest neighbours of users 퐾 is set
to {1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50}, where the attack size = 2% and we attack random target items. In FilmtTrust and
Amazons datasets, we can observe that the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 increases as user-based CF considers more nearest neighbours of users.
For instance, when the fake user is the 25th nearest neighbour of user 푢, if user 푢 only considers the top-20 nearest neighbours,
he can avoid the attack; if the user considers top-30 nearest neighbours, he will be effected. However, in the Movielens, we
notice that the퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 decreases after퐾 is set higher than 30. The possible reason is that Movielens is a dense dataset. Setting
higher 퐾 for user 푢 may contain more normal users who have rated the target items, thus pushing the fake users out of top-K
nearest neighbours.
Impact of the weight of different loss functions. Figure 3 (f) shows the performance of our attack method depending on the
value of 휆, where the attack size = 2% and we attack random target items. 휆 controls the relative importance of 푙표푠푠1 and 푙표푠푠2.
Setting 휆 to 1 or 0 means we only consider the 푙표푠푠1 or 푙표푠푠2 respectively in the overall loss function. It can be noticed that the
푙표푠푠1 imposes higher impact on the performance of our method. Besides, we can see that our attack method in different datasets
achieves the best performance with different 휆 values (e.g. 휆 = 0.6 for FilmTrust, 휆 = 0.5 for Movielens, 휆 = 0.3 for Amazons).
4.3 Transferability
Previous sections demonstrate the performance of our method in the white-box setting. In addition, adversarial samples usually
have another important property, namely transferability36. Adversarial samples that are generated based on a certain model can
also successfully fool other models with the same task. This case of attacks is named black-box attacks. Nowadays, web and apps
show and collect information through a terminal machine. Then, a model deployed on cloud servers will handle this information.
In this case, an attacker is able to acquire data through crawlers, but the structure and parameters of the model are hard to acquire
because the model is deployed on cloud servers. Therefore, we consider that data poisoning attack in the black-box setting is
generally more realistic and common than in the white-box setting.
To explore the performance of our attack method in the black-box setting, we inject fake users generated by UNAttack to
against other CF recommender systems and explore the robustness of them. Two state-of-the-art CF recommender systems, i.e.,
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BPRMF23 and NCF22, are chosen as illustrative examples. Firstly, the fake user will be generated based on the neighborhood-
based recommender system. In this experiment, K and N are set to 30 and 20 respectively, and the number of filler-items is set
to the average rating number of normal users. Note that in this experiment, the Cosine Similarity is chosen in training the fake
user’s phrase. In fact, other similarity measurement methods also can be applied such as Euclidean Distance-based Similarity
and Pearson Similarity. Secondly, for the model BPRMF and NCF, we fix the embedding size to 20 and N to 20, and the learning
rate is set to {0.001, 0.005, 0.01}. The original퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 of target items will be calculated after the training based on the original
data푅푚×푛. We define the푅푚×푛 added with fake users as푅′푚×푛 and train the model based on the푅′푚×푛 to obtain the new퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표.
TABLE 3 Overall performance of transferability.
Dataset Method BPRMF NCF0.50% 1% 2% 0.50% 1% 2%
Filmtrust
None 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
Random 0.0055 0.0071 0.0079 0.0087 0.0098 0.0312
Average 0.0055 0.0071 0.0079 0.0087 0.0098 0.0317
Popular 0.0055 0.0071 0.0079 0.0087 0.0097 0.0312
Co-visitation 0.0162 0.1939 0.2164 0.0243 0.0854 0.0981
UNAttack 0.0942 0.2266 0.2565 0.0668 0.2042 0.2223
Movielen
None 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052 0.0079 0.0079 0.0079
Random 0.0052 0.0128 0.0173 0.0079 0.0085 0.0154
Average 0.0052 0.0129 0.0176 0.0079 0.0087 0.0154
Popular 0.0052 0.0129 0.0175 0.0079 0.0084 0.0158
Co-visitation 0.0082 0.0130 0.0189 0.0079 0.0090 0.0169
UNAttack 0.0115 0.0159 0.0247 0.0113 0.0184 0.0247
Amazons
None 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 0.0055 0.0055 0.0055
Random 0.0174 0.0874 0.0132 0.0142 0.0157 0.0652
Average 0.0176 0.0875 0.0131 0.0141 0.0153 0.0651
Popular 0.0172 0.0867 0.0132 0.0142 0.0153 0.0653
Co-visitation 0.0562 0.2890 0.3443 0.0981 0.1519 0.1657
UNAttack 0.0993 0.3651 0.4082 0.1167 0.2946 0.3260
From the experimental results shown in Table 3, we can obtain the following observations:
• As can be observed, all data poisoning attack methods can be transferred to attack both BPRMF and NCF, and if attackers
inject enough fake users into recommender systems, they can improve the퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 upon the case of None. For example,
in the FilmTrust dataset, when attacking BPRMF and NCF by injecting 2% fake users, the HitRatio of UNAttack achieves
0.2565 and 0.2223, which is 213 times and 199 times higher than the None. This phenomenon can be explained by the
fact that almost all the CF recommender systems will learn the correlation between users’ historical information, which
will be utilized to generate a personalized ranking list for users. The correlation learned by different CF recommender
systems may be similar. Therefore, the fake users generated by UNAttack also can be transferred to attack BPRMF and
NCF effectively.
• In the dense dataset, it is harder for the attacker to achieve the improvement of 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표. For example, when the attack
size is set to 0.5%, in the Movielens dataset, UNAttack only improves 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표 4.7 times over the None lower than 15
times in the white-box setting. This phenomenon is similar in attacking the neighborhood-based CF.
• Among all methods, UNAttack largely outperforms the traditional attack methods and the state-of-the-art methods Co-
visitation whether attacking the BPRMF or NCF on the three datasets. For instance, in the Amazons dataset, when
attacking NCF by injecting 2% fake users, the best HitRatio of Co-visitation14 reaches 0.1656 and our UNAttack can
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obtain 0.3260. This roughly 1 times relative improvement demonstrates the advantage of combining optimal technique
with data poisoning.
• NCF has better robustness against the data poisoning method than BPRMF. For example, in the Amazons dataset, when
attacking NCF by injecting 2% fake users, UNAttack achieves 59.4 times improvement compared with the None, whereas
it can achieve 122.8 times improvement in attacking BPRMF. The reason lies in that NCF unifies the linearity of MF and
the non-linearity of multi-layer perceptron (MLP).
5 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel target attack framework against recommmender systems. Data poisoning attack against
neighborhood-based methods is encoded into our framework from the perspective of optimization. The generated fake users
are injected into original data when attacking the neighborhood-based recommendation so that we can improve the 퐻푖푡푅푎푡푖표
of the target items. Further, a cold-start item can be changed to a warm-start item. In addition, attack on BPRMF and NCF
are conducted to demonstrate that our method can work in the black-box setting. The results of the experiments on three real-
world datasets indicate the effectiveness and transferability of our method via comparing with the state-of-the-art methods when
targeting different types of target items.
In the future, how to achieve the good performance of our method will be studied, even if we only know part of the dataset.
With the rapid development of deep learning based recommender systems, wewould like to design data poisoning attacks against
the recommender systems based on deep learning. Moreover, we are interested in building an effective defence model to detect
the data poisoning attack.
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